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Despite the enormous popularity of the market for repurchase agreements, the behavior of
interest rates on “repo” transactions is not well understood. An analysis of new data for 
1992-95 reveals that repo rates on recently issued Treasury notes rise and fall in a regular 
pattern as the Treasury auction cycle progresses. 
In the past several years, the market for repurchase
agreements—the “repo market”—has grown rapidly,
achieving a daily trading volume in excess of $500 bil-
lion. Securities dealers, corporate underwriters, money
managers, and others routinely use the market as a tem-
porary funding mechanism. Spurred by the need to
finance inventories or fulfill commitments to cus-
tomers, these institutions enter the market to borrow
money or securities for return at a later date.
Despite the repo market’s size and popularity, infor-
mation about basic market characteristics is surpris-
ingly limited. This edition of Current Issues sheds light
on an important segment of the market, the borrowing
of newly issued Treasury securities. Using new data for
the 1992-95 period, we track the interest rate on these
transactions—the “repo rate”—and evaluate the associ-
ated costs. To the casual observer, repo rate movements
may appear irregular and transaction costs high. We
demonstrate, however, that repo rates follow a pre-
dictable pattern based on Treasury auction cycles and
that costs are in fact modest. 
Understanding Repo Transactions
Repurchase agreements are essentially collateralized
loans: when the object of the transaction is to borrow
money, securities are posted as collateral; when the
object is to borrow securities, the collateral is cash. In
both cases, the instrument borrowed is returned to the
original holder when the loan matures. Although these
loans can be of any maturity, the great majority mature
after one day, and transaction length rarely exceeds
ninety days.1
The price of a repo transaction is always expressed
as an interest rate. Dealers2 that enter the market to bor-
row money against securities will pay the “general repo
rate”—an interest rate tied to general market interest
rates. For dealers that enter the market to borrow secu-
rities, however, the price of the transaction is more
complicated. As the providers of funds (they post cash
as collateral to obtain securities), these dealers receive
an interest rate. If this rate drops below the general
repo rate prevailing over the term of the loan, it is said
to be “special.” Repo rates become special when deal-
ers need specific securities to cover “short sales” and
consequently accept a lower return on their funds to
obtain them.3 (The use of the repo market to cover
short sales is explained in the box.) For dealers in this
position, receiving a special repo rate on their funds is
equivalent to paying the spread between that rate and
the general repo rate. 
Note that the price paid by these dealers will fluc-
tuate with the availability of the securities they are 
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repo market, the spread between the general and the
special repo rates will widen, driving up the effective
cost of the transaction.4
Repo Rate Patterns and the Treasury Auction Cycle
In this section, we track the spread between general and
special repo rates over the Treasury auction cycle for
new notes. This spread is our measure of “specialness.”
We focus on the most recently issued coupon securi-
ties—called on-the-run issues by market partici-
pants—because most trading and hedging occur in
these highly liquid notes.
For the period June 1992 through January 1995, we
studied transaction data for thirty-one monthly cycles
of the two-year note and the five-year note, eleven
quarterly cycles of the three-year note, and ten quar-
terly cycles of the ten-year note.5 Both monthly and
quarterly cycles were defined as beginning on the issue
date and ending on the subsequent issue date.6 We con-
verted the data to cycle averages for each maturity sec-
tor, with the position in the cycle defined as the number
of business days until the next issuance of a note with
the same original maturity.
Some of the issues in our sample were “reopened”
issues. The Treasury at times expands the supply of an
outstanding issue of notes rather than issuing new
notes. In the case of ten-year notes, the Treasury
reopened issues in three of the ten cycles we tracked.
Our analysis of the data reveals a strong positive cor-
relation between repo specialness and the Treasury auc-
tion cycle. On average, repo rates for the most recently
issued notes become increasingly special until the next
issue is announced (Charts 1 and 2).7 Despite differ-
ences in maturity and issue size, strong cyclical pat-
terns emerge for all four maturity sectors of the note
market. In addition, the two notes on a monthly auction
cycle exhibit almost identical specialness patterns
(Chart 1), as do the notes on a quarterly cycle (Chart 2).8
What accounts for the patterns we observe? For both
the monthly and the quarterly cycles, the average special-
ness of a new issue increases over the cycle because the
proportion of the issue available to the repo market pro-
gressively diminishes as the notes are placed in invest-
ment portfolios. The tendency of average specialness to
peak and then decline rapidly once the next issue is
announced reflects the same natural market forces.
Activity shifts to the newest issue because it is more plen-
tiful and, consequently, much less likely to be special.
Although the general pattern of specialness is the
same for all market sectors, the monthly and quarterly
cycles progress in slightly different ways. For the
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Using the Repo Market to Cover Short Sales
Much of the activity in the special repo market stems
from the need to cover short sales. A dealer that sells
“short” is selling a security that it does not own.
When the time comes to deliver the promised secu-
rity, the dealer will arrange to borrow it through a
repo transaction with a customer or another dealer.
Since the loan is likely to mature quickly, often
overnight, the dealer may choose to extend the trans-
action by renewing the loan with the original counter-
party, borrowing the same security from another
party in the repo market, or borrowing the security
for a longer period. Alternatively, the dealer can
choose to close out its position by purchasing the
security in the cash market and delivering it to the
repo counterparty. 
Still unanswered is the question, Why does a
dealer sell a security it does not own? Dealers sell 
securities short to profit from, or hedge against, ris-
ing interest rates. If interest rates rise, the price of a
fixed-rate security falls. A dealer that has sold a secu-
rity it does not own stands to profit by purchasing the
security later at a lower price. If that dealer has hold-
ings that will lose value when interest rates rise, the
move to sell short and buy later will offset this expo-
sure. By countering potential losses with potential
gains, the dealer hedges its balance sheet against
changes in interest rates.
As the discussion makes clear, dealers use the repo
market to finance their cash market positions. The
great advantage of the repo market as a funding
mechanism is its flexibility:  dealers that are uncer-
tain how long they will need to maintain a position or
a hedge can borrow securities for a short period or, if
necessary, extend the loan indefinitely.
Our analysis of the data reveals a strong 
positive correlation between repo specialness
and the Treasury auction cycle. On average,
repo rates for the most recently issued notes
become increasingly special until the next 
issue is announced.monthly cycle, specialness increases smoothly over the
life of the new security and peaks near the announce-
ment of the next issue. For the quarterly cycle, special-
ness increases over the cycle but exhibits two notable
peaks. One peak occurs about the time the next issue is
announced, when demand for the on-the-run issue has
crested. The other peak occurs approximately halfway
through the cycle (thirty to thirty-five days before the
next issue date). This earlier peak coincides with 
quarter-end periods and reflects the tendency of general
repo rates to rise at the end of a quarter. Most likely,
general repo rates rise because market participants are
less willing to borrow funds at this time, preferring to
reduce the size of their balance sheets in advance of
statement dates. 
For reopened issues, the average level of specialness
remains below that for other issues of the same matu-
rity (Chart 2). The greater size of a reopened issue—
typically about double that of nonreopened issues—
means that the scarcity value of these notes, and hence
their specialness, will be less. Despite this difference,
the basic repo pattern for reopened and nonreopened
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Chart 1￿
Average Spread between General and Special Repo ￿
Rates for Two- and Five-Year Treasury Notes￿
Monthly Auction Cycle
Notes:  The spread is calculated using overnight rates from June 12, 1992, to ￿
January 25, 1995. The monthly auction cycle extends from one issue date to the ￿
next. The shaded area marks announcement days for the next issue.




Business days to next issuance
Chart 2￿
Average Spread between General and Special Repo Rates for Three- and Ten-Year Treasury Notes￿
Quarterly Auction Cycle
Notes:  The spread is calculated using overnight rates from June 12, 1992, to January 25, 1995. The quarterly auction cycle extends from one issue date to the next. The shaded ￿












Although the general pattern of specialness 
is the same for all market sectors, the monthly
and quarterly cycles progress in slightly 
different ways.issue, spikes at the end of each quarter, and reaches its
peak just before the announcement of the next issue.
As we have seen, repo specialness follows a regular
pattern that is closely tied to the Treasury auction cycle.
The predictability of this behavior allows participants
to anticipate the additional funding costs associated
with repo specialness. These costs are the subject of our
next section.
Specialness Costs
For dealers borrowing Treasury securities in the repo
market, the cost of the transaction is equivalent to the
spread between the general repo rate and the special
repo rate they earn on the money lent to their counter-
parties. These spreads can be sizable, often rising to
hundreds of basis points on an annualized basis. Recall,
however, that in most of these transactions, the dealers
agree to return the securities after only one day, and few
repo transactions extend beyond ninety days. Once we
adjust for these brief holding periods, potential cumula-
tive costs appear low (Table 1). Even for large repo
spreads, the marginal cost over short holding periods is
not especially high. Repo specialness of 400 basis
points on an annualized basis will result in a marginal
cost of about 1 basis point for an overnight loan.
To put these costs in perspective, consider the fol-
lowing: Underwriters of investment-grade corporate
bonds would expect to earn between 25 and 75 basis
points in fees for placing securities. If in hedging the
interest rate risk on these activities the underwriters
faced an exposure to repo specialness of as much as
400 basis points over an entire week, they would still
pay less than 8 basis points, an amount easily absorbed
by their fee structure.
When we look at the actual specialness costs for all
transactions in our sample (Table 2), they prove to be
even more modest than the potential costs cited in 
Table 1. The cumulative cycle costs, which reflect the
average expected cost for a participant who maintains
an exposure to specialness for the entire cycle, are gen-
erally low. For most issues, the average monthly spe-
cialness costs are only 2 to 5 basis points. The excep-
tion is the standard or nonreopened ten-year issue,
which shows an average monthly specialness cost of 12
basis points. The higher average specialness costs for
these notes may reflect the smaller size of the issues.
Overall, average specialness costs vary somewhat
among maturity sectors, but all appear small in absolute
terms.
The Relationship between Cash Market Premia
and Specialness Costs. Specialness costs appear even
more reasonable when we consider that they are some-
times offset by changes in cash market premia.
Investors’ strong preference for liquidity creates an
increased demand for the most recently issued Treasury
securities. For this reason, on-the-run Treasury notes
typically trade at a small premium until the next issue
of the same maturity is announced, when the premium
dissipates or declines.9 Investors can capture this pre-
mium if they sell the on-the-run securities short, cover
the sales by borrowing in the repo market, and then buy
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Table 1
Potential Specialness Costs for New Treasury Notes,




between General and  Seven Thirty Ninety
Special Repo Rates Overnight Days Days Days
25 0.1 0.5 2.1 6.3
50 0.1 1.0 4.2 12.5
100 0.3 1.9 8.3 25.0
200 0.6 3.9 16.7 50.0
400 1.1 7.8 33.3 100.0
Source:  Author’s calculations.
Note:  We convert annual repo spreads to an overnight holding period
by dividing the repo spread by 360. For longer terms, we use the repo
market convention of multiplying rather than compounding to convert
the annual spread. The marginal cost of repo specialness is simply
these adjusted amounts multiplied by the dollar value of the repo loan.
Table 2
Observed Specialness Spread for New Treasury Notes
Typical Number Average Cumulative Cost per
Issue Size of Actual Spread Cycle Cost Month
Maturity Sector Issuance Cycle (Billions of Dollars) Cycles (Basis Points) (Basis Points) (Basis Points)
Two-year Monthly 17 31 27 2 2
Three-year Quarterly 15 11 41 10 3
Five-year Monthly 11 31 58 5 5
Ten-year Quarterly 12 7 143 35 12
Ten-year, reopened Quarterly 23 3 62 15 5
Sources:  U.S. Department of the Treasury; proprietary data sources; author’s calculations.the securities after the next issue is announced. In other
words, these investors can profit from selling the secu-
rities at the initial higher price and buying them when
the price premium evaporates. This small gain may
help to offset the specialness cost that the short seller
faces.
Alternative Costs. How do specialness costs com-
pare with the costs of not using the repo market?
Dealers that ordinarily borrow in the repo market to
maintain a hedge against changing interest rates have
two alternatives: they can cover a short position by buy-
ing a security outright or they can leave their existing
exposure unhedged. To assess the costs of these alterna-
tives, we use the price risk faced by holders of Treasury
notes in a particularly volatile quarter of 1994 as a
proxy for the cost of not using the repo market (Table 3).
This measure indicates how much note prices could
swing in response to extreme fluctuations in interest
rates. As the comparison presented in Table 3 shows, the
average monthly repo specialness costs that dealers
would incur in insulating themselves against such fluc-
tuations are small relative to the daily and weekly price
exposure faced by note holders and to the underwriting
fees earned by corporate bond underwriters.
Conclusion
Our analysis of repo specialness for the 1992-95 period
yields four major findings. First, repo rate movements
for new Treasury securities follow a predictable pattern
that is closely aligned with the Treasury auction cycle.
Second, differences between general and special repo
rates are normal, repeating events. Third, the costs
associated with repo market patterns are quite small for
short holding periods and may be offset for some par-
ticipants by gains from declining cash market premia.
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Treasury Monthly Weekly Bond
Note Specialness Daily Price Price Underwriter
Maturity Cost Exposure Exposure Fee
Two-year 2 28 69 25
Three-year 3 42 99 35
Five-year 5 72 154 50
Ten-year 12 117 241 62.5
Ten-year,
reopened 5 117 241 62.5
Sources:  Proprietary data sources; HSBC Securities; author’s calculations.
Note:  The price exposures are based on data from second-quarter
1994 and assume confidence intervals of two standard deviations.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the costs of repo
specialness seem quite reasonable when compared with
those created by the alternatives to the repo market. On
the whole, our analysis suggests that recurring special-
ness in newly issued Treasury notes reflects a highly
active and cost-effective marketplace. 
Endnotes
1. See Duffie (1996) or Stigum (1989) for a lengthier introduction
to repo market mechanics.
2. This article focuses on dealers as the most representative group
among the broad range of institutions participating in the repo market.
3. Note, however, that dealers are sometimes able to obtain specific
securities at a rate equivalent to the general repo rate.
4. It is possible, of course, to take a different view. Because dealers
that need to borrow a specific Treasury issue cannot do so in the
general collateral market, some market participants may not con-
sider the spread between the general repo rate and the special repo
rate a “cost” of selling a specific issue short. Although repo rates
represent one component of the price of the trade, the change in
price of the underlying security and the price change’s deviation
from expectations are other components.
5. The raw data for this analysis were provided by sources outside
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and consequently cannot be
made available to readers.
6. Although cycles may be defined as extending from announce-
ment to announcement or from auction to auction, we choose the
issue date as the starting and ending point for the cycle because
cash market trades do not require use of the repo market until the
issue date.
7. Trading in new Treasury notes begins anywhere from one to two
weeks before the original issue date, immediately after the Treasury
announces the auction date and size of an issue.
8. These findings are consistent with data presented in Duffie
(1996), who studies an earlier sample period (1988-92). The rise
and fall of the repo spread pattern is also broadly consistent with
the model presented by Fisher and Gilles (1995).
9. The premium attaching to the newest Treasury notes may also
derive in part from the expected value of repo specialness over the
on-the-run period. Figure 4 in Duffie (1996) provides a helpful
illustration of the impact of repo specialness on note prices.
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